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Abstract
The twentieth century starts with a rediscovery of the collective dimension that legal modernity had compressed. The
vivid debate that came with the fascist corporatist experiment is an interesting observatory that lets us read this process
against the light. According to the major part of Italian legal culture the corporatist cultural project seems to forewarn a
new framework of the connections between public and private spheres, state and society, law and economics, statism
and pluralism. Corporatism, which did not intend to build a non-statual model of authority, was an answer to the need to
attribute legal value and legal autonomy to economic and social actors that weren’t adequately represented in the political
and normative circuit. The paper is aimed at retracing some of the discursive strategies that characterized the corporatist
experiment and the different legitimization models that were proposed by legal theory in order to rebuild the dichotomy
between public and private spheres.
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1. Defining the Field of Inquiry
This paper focuses on a particular case of “public–private
regulation” (Collin, Bender, Ruppert, Seckelmann, &
Stolleis, 2014) the form of it advanced by Italian fascism
via corporativism, amid contradictions and inconsisten-
cies. Fascist corporativism was a major experiment in re-
organizing normativity, the aim being to create a juridi-
cal area where new form could be given to the tradi-
tional dichotomy between public authority and the pri-
vate sphere.
This is an elusive phenomenon. Corporativism is an
ambiguous notion/praxis (Schmitter, 1974; Tarello, 1988)
in which the relationship between theory and practice
is far from linear. I shall concentrate on the conceptual
and doctrinal side to fascist corporativism, since that is
where we see most explicitly the legitimating rhetoric
used in preparing, accompanying, commenting and criti-
cising that attempt to revise the political and legal set-up
enacted between the mid-1920s and the early 1940s.
I shall be referring to corporativism as a historical
phenomenon that was typical of Europe between the
two wars, focusing on the Italian case which has made
corporativism a kind of cradle. Broadly speaking, corpo-
rativism is “a way in which political power can reframe
in a society invaded by social organizations which jeopar-
dize the traditional closed structure of the State” (Cass-
ese, 2012b, p. 96). I shall explicitly not be going into the
specialist sense attached to the term by political science
from the 1970s on, whereby corporativismwas seen as a
useful model by which to analyse certain features of ma-
ture capitalist societies (Cerasi, 2001; Schmitter, 1992;
Stolzi, 2009; Tarello, 1979).
As historians have often pointed out (Gagliardi, 2010;
Mazzacane, 2002; Mazzacane, Somma, & Stolleis, 2005;
Santomassimo, 2006; Stolzi, 2007), there developed a
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 26–33 26
telling gap between the institutional reality of fascist
corporativism and the enormous intellectual investment
that accompanied it. Legal science at that time produced
a minutely argued commentary on the corporative re-
formulation of the State. Such thinking made no signifi-
cant impact on the concrete decisions of the regime, but
nonetheless forms a fascinatingwindowonto the various
discursive strategies that underpinned the fascist legal
system presented by its proponents as a breakthrough
on traditional forms of state-oriented rule of law.
This was far from the case, but at any rate to be-
gin with (and on paper, at least) corporativism was a
legal system that seemed to inject regulatory indepen-
dence into organised forms of private interest. It thus set
up a normative stepping-stone between the two tradi-
tional poles of legal dialogue: the private and the pub-
lic (Stolzi, 2012c). As recently described, “in general le-
gal theorists interested in promoting the nascent corpo-
ratistic order saw it as an opportunity, not only to re-
flect on trade union and production relations, but also,
inmore general terms, to provide an account of relations
between the individual, state and social organizations”
(Stolzi, 2014, p. 151).
But it soon became apparent that an experiment
which theoretically promised to etch away the state-
oriented rule of law and redistribute sovereignty within
organised society would not actually enter into com-
petition with the State, but would reconfirm it in
its supremacy.
Theoretically speaking, corporativism was a late-
nineteenth century development within European so-
cial Catholicism—as with Ketteler, Vogelsang, la Tour du
Pin, de Mun, Toniolo—(Santomassimo, 2006, pp. 86–91;
Schiera, 2005, pp. 44–47; Vallauri, 1971, pp. 10–64) and
French solidarism—as with Durkheim, Duguit, Bonjour—
(Laborde, 1996; Riquelme, 2010). These sought to read-
just relations between the State and society so as to
give greater independence (including normative inde-
pendence) to social dynamics. The fascist experiment
soon scotched such aspirations and instead of decreas-
ing the gap between State and individual, gave new cen-
trality to state authority.
However, regime rhetoric was full of the subject of or-
ganized groups enjoying regulatory autonomy, insisting
(both in intellectual argument and in public discourse)
that a third area of law be created in which the identity
of State power might be redefined and the ambit of po-
litical decision-making thrown open to the various social
groups (Stolzi, 2014, pp. 154–160). Such legislative inde-
pendence soon proved void in point of fact, being rapidly
absorbed into the state mentality of fascism, but it did
leave its mark on the language of fascist juridical science.
It is interesting to trace some of the main staging
posts by which theoretical legitimization was given to
corporativism, and how it would every so often be pre-
sented as a kind of self-government by society, an op-
portunity to pick up true post-1789 revolutionary val-
ues, a solution by which the gap between State and
private citizen could be shortened and the outline of
sovereignty readjusted.
2. Corporativism as a Reaction to Crisis of State
Before weighing the role of the public/private dichotomy
in the various interpretations of corporativism, we
should do well to place the phenomenon in its historical
context. The century had begun with rumours that the
traditional model of State-based rule of law was facing
a crisis. What was in crisis was the image of liberal bour-
geois society: the society of the Code, hinging on prop-
erty and freedom of negotiation. Two sovereign bod-
ies stood opposed: the individual in the field of prop-
erty and economic action, and the State in the field of
command and the community. Society—structured into
unions, parties, leagues and associations—was hemmed
between these two dimensions. In other words, bour-
geois society had buried the “communal” and “social”
in the State, obliterating them inside a single politi-
cal entity envisaged as a person (Grossi, 2012, p. 14;
Marchetti, 2006).
One of the first and most astute analyses of this
distortion of State structure was provided by Santi Ro-
mano. In his well-known Lo Stato Moderno e la Sua Crisi
(1909) he described the gradual eclipsing of the State,
browbeaten by a social movement “governed by laws
of its own” and “antagonistic in attitude towards the
State” (Romano, 1950)1. The mounting claims of the pro-
fessional associations and new social forces which Ro-
mano described as corporativism and trade-unionism,
were bringing about no less than the “decomposition of
the modern State”.
As he would confirm in his 1918 study, L’Ordinamen-
to Giuridico, which outlined his institutionalist theory,
the legal expert was up against pressure from the collec-
tive dimension beyond (and to some extent above) the
State. Hence Romano’s bid (he was not alone) to recover
a series of “public” areas of society detached from the
power dimension of the State. The plural nature of soci-
ety needed to be reinstated and its normative potential
progressively reappraised.
The war had made it clear that normativism was no
longer an adequate instrument to govern the newmodel
of society. Special wartime legislation had set in place
a new equilibrium between the State’s ability to inter-
vene in the dynamics of the economyand the inviolability
of private independence.2 By contrast, the complex rela-
tions between capitalism and mass society had changed
some of the paradigms of traditional legal doctrine. One
thinks of the entrepreneur, a forcibly emerging figure
who hardly fitted in with the classic patterns of private
1 The literature on Romano’s inaugural address is copious; one may cite Grossi (2011), Cassese (2012a), Ripepe (2012), Luongo (2013).
2 An illuminating analysis of this point was made by Filippo Vassalli in his inaugural lecture On Wartime Legislation and the New Confines of Private Law
in November 1918 (Vassalli, 1939).
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property, or the pressure to detach labour contract from
the bounds of legal negotiation and to include the collec-
tive dimension in the dynamics of labour law (Cazzetta,
2007; Grossi, 2000). The bid for more pluralistic articula-
tion of society increasingly pressurized the State. It was
to these stimuli that the corporative experiments ush-
ered in during the 1920s responded.
In the case of Italy this process took a line all of
its own. Compared with the Weimar experience, Fas-
cism’s was branded as pseudo-corporativism (Grossi,
2012, p. 16) owing to the rapid list towards state au-
thoritarianism. Some of the closest observers nonethe-
less noted the pluralistic vein of all corporativist structure
and gave this its due, at least in theory.
The need to make the State fit into the new social
reality demanded that not just the individual but organ-
ised social groups be given a central importance. New
tools of legislation and experiments in institutional en-
gineering were required to redress the relationship be-
tween State and organised interests, between politics
and the economy, public and private. As Giuseppe Bot-
tai, a charismatic intellectual leader under Fascism, re-
marked in 1928: “onemay not adore themasses, but one
cannot reject them, one cannot ignore that they are here
to stay” (Bottai, 1934, p. 32).
In short, society was no longer “the mechanical sum
of its individuals” (Panunzio); it was forming into sub-
groups demanding amore active, independent role from
a legal point of view, among others. The State as inher-
ited from the French Revolution, in which all legal phe-
nomena boiled down to the relationship between State
and citizen, had vanished out of all recognition. One of
the leaders in the debate on building the “new State”,
Sergio Panunzio, recalled: “Its pure, majestic, classical
and statutory line has snapped and gone awry. Nor can it
be put back to its original form. Absurd: only the wreck-
age remains of the old idea and old form of the State.
The State grows dim and takes a step back; what emerges
and comes to the fore is Society” (Panunzio, 1987, p. 157).
The “State of individuals”, as he remarked in his inaugural
lecture at Ferrara University in November 1922, would
give way to the “unionised State and inter-union, supra-
union law” (Panunzio, 1987, p. 139).
What ratified the “newmodel of social organisation”,
literally and intentionally, was the Charter of Labour
of 1926 (Carta del Lavoro) which ushered in the fas-
cist experiment with corporativism. It established a uni-
fied trade-union, introduced collective bargaining, and
banned strike action or lock-out. Spontaneous social for-
mations were denied any autonomous legal recognition,
though on paper and in increasingly authoritarian terms
it did signify some acceptance of the intermediate role
of a socio-political compact. The basic assumption was
that the trade-union was recognised as the new way of
structuring the social sphere, which therefore entailed a
new concept of the State (Stolzi, 2014, pp. 153–155).
Right from the outset there were glaring ambiguities.
The new social actors were accorded recognition and full
legal status, but in the same breath the non-interference
pact between State and society was officially rescinded.
In theory at least, this trend seemed as though it might
pave the way for recognition of the private/social ori-
gin of law; in actual fact, its aim was to make the State
the sole arbiter of collective life. The main influence be-
hind the 1926 law, Alfredo Rocco, was quite clear that
any opening towards a new legal framework for social
organisations would be matched by a reorganisation of
state power.3
Society was seen as somehow “outside” the State,
and rules were drawn up to control and limit its indepen-
dence. While it is true, in Rocco’s words, that State au-
thority and power did not mean “bullying and undue in-
terference”, the fascist perspective nonetheless implied
“the assertion that State goals were superior to those of
lesser bodies and individuals” (Rocco, 1938, p. 478).
Hence this was by no means a decentralising of state
authority, nor full recognition of the legal independence
of the social dimension. There was no room for inroads
“beyond the State”. In other words, all forms of plural-
ism were brought within the framework of the State. In
Rocco’s view, accepting the force of self-organisation by
society was not to lead to organisms being set up that
might “outweigh the State” (Stolzi, 2007, p. 27). As he
remarked in November 1920, the new social ferment
formed a threat to the State: “The State is in a crisis; day
by day, the State is dissolving into a host of lesser units,
parties, associations, leagues, unions, that tie it down,
paralyse it, stifle it” (Rocco, 1938, p. 631).
The case of the trade-unions was emblematic in this
respect: their private-law statute was absorbed into the
public domain of the State. That union organisation was
recognised, but it needed disciplining. Intermediate so-
cial organisations lying halfway between the State and
private individuals became an interlocutor with state
power, but were subordinate to state authority. This
got round the danger that the vigour of social dynam-
ics might lead to a regulatory framework in competition
with the State. The movement to organise private inter-
ests, at first seen as a threat to the State, now became an
important “governing resource” (Stolzi, 2007, p. 108).
3. The Legal Scholar’s Point of View
Fascism’s idea of corporativism was designed to bridge
the gap in the liberal model whereby power and the in-
dividual were kept apart. It made much of the claim to
be part of a project: the State proclaimed itself the fruit
of radical revising of the basic structures of the tradi-
tional legal set-up. Rocco had this in mind when he em-
phasised that the 1926 Charter of Labour was “the most
profound transformation the State had undergone since
the French Revolution” (Rocco, 1938, p. 335).
3 Amember of the nationalistmovement, Alfredo Rocco (1875–1935) joined fascism in 1923. HewasMinister of Justice (1925–1932). For a reconstruction
of his thought see D’Alfonso (2004), Simone (2012), Speciale (2012), Chiodi (2015).
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Italian legal thinking was divided over the launching
of this experiment. A large part, most closely linked to
tradition, had little faith that the corporative revolution
would reform the coordinates of the juridical system. Au-
thors like Vittorio Emanuele4 Orlando or Salvatore Pugli-
atti5 refused to believe that the nascent corporative sys-
tem was really capable of overthrowing the traditional
model of coexistence, based as that was on sharp sepa-
ration between private and public, contractual freedom
and general interest. For such jurists, recognition of the
State’s active new role in the social and economic sphere
did not imply any substantial change in the ratio between
private and public power as nineteenth-century tradition
had handed it down.
Another faction took the opposite view: that here
was a project that would truly demarcate new bound-
aries for the private and public spheres.
3.1. Full-Scale Statism Versus Trade-Unionism
One of the clear leaders in this debate was Giuseppe Bot-
tai6. In the years when the corporative system was being
set in place he held a series of important political posts
and would afterwards unceasingly ponder (and criticise)
the course that the corporation experiment was taking.
To Bottai, corporativism was indeed the way round the
old forms of statism. To emerge from the impasse, the
State should revert to being “the supreme organiser
of the social side” (Stolzi, 2007). The behaviour of the
groups intowhichmass society had fallenwas something
to govern, so as to prevent them getting out of hand
or giving rise to forms of power in competition with the
State. But it was a way round the old strategies by which
the State had hitherto guided and stemmed the pres-
sures of society: the solution could not lie in simple cen-
tralisation of administration or increasing control mea-
sures over the doings of intermediate bodies. To Bottai
the State’s rolewas not to guide, but to take a new lead in
economic and social affairs. To do so it needed new bod-
ies specifically appointed to run society and meanwhile
bolster the authority of the overall State (Bottai, 1934).
The way previous statism was reformed was by radi-
calising it. The basic unit of State ceased to be the individ-
ual; the new centrewas the corporation and trade-union,
which promised to harness social forces with State pow-
ers. The unions ceased to be seen as a threat to public
power: to Bottai (and also Panunzio)7 they and the cor-
porations became the fulcrum of that new link between
State and society and that new concept of sovereignty
which was meant to rest upon social organisations. In
this sense, Bottai argued, the corporative State was the
fateful outcome of modern history and the death-knell
of those French Revolutionary principles whereby the in-
dividual was ensured independence and freedom from
the State (Bottai, 1934, p. 569).
Recognition of social formations was one way of
shortening the distance between the individual and au-
thority, yet ultimately the regime did not accord the in-
termediate forms of organisation any real regulatory in-
dependence. The unions and corporations were not al-
lowed to regulate their own lives, let alone relations with
the rest of society and the institutions. The gap sepa-
rating society from authority would hence be reduced
by absorbing the former into the State. Demiurgic state
power thus ended by depotentiating the social organisa-
tions and robbing them of all the trappings of norma-
tive authority. Social forces’ self-regulatory power was
nothing more than formal, actually ignored in order to
avoid the existence of normative powers other than the
State itself.
Bottai and Panunzio reacted vigorously at this be-
trayal by Fascism of the corporative ideal (Stolzi, 2007,
pp. 134–167). The corporations gradually grew more bu-
reaucratic, and over the years this deprived the interme-
diate formations of independence and clout, such that
they were quickly encroached on by state power. The
fascist regime—charged Bottai—had compressed the so-
cial dialectics that it ostensibly wished to promote, in
doing which it had taken a leaf out of the old liberal
State’s book.
3.2. Corporative Idealism: Society to Identify with the
State
One of the most radical visions of the corporative ven-
ture stemmed from idealist philosophy. To authors like
Ugo Spirito8 and Arnaldo Volpicelli,9 shortening the gap
between State and individual was meant to come about
when the two parties identified and the individual’s in-
terests were absorbed in public dynamics. The starting
assumption—that the traditional framework of social
coexistence represented a social deficit—was one they
4 Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (1860–1950) was the founder of the Italian school of public law, a discipline that he helped set on a theoretical basis. He
was not only the most representative jurist of liberal Italy, but also a highly experienced politician who held important posts in government between
1916 and 1920; cf. Cianferotti (1980), Fioravanti (2001).
5 Salvatore Pugliatti (1903–1976) was one of the most sensitive voices in Italian juridical science; cf. Grossi (2002, pp. 95–119).
6 Giuseppe Bottai (1895–1959) was one of themost active fascist intellectuals and held many political posts (governor of Rome, governor of Addis Abeba,
minister of corporations, education minister). As Sabino Cassese wrote, “Bottai was a keen commentator on corporation activity….In such articles he
constantly mentioned the political side to corporations as distinct from the technical aspect of the unions; he was concerned to show that corporativism
was not the fruit of arbitrary improvisation but matured out of the crisis of the liberal State; his was a ‘statist’ approach, and critical of ‘mixed unions’”;
cf. Cassese (1971).
7 The jurist Sergio Panunzio (1886–1944) was a keen observer of the fascist movement in which he became one of the most influential theoreticians and
technicians. His theory of the fascist State hinged on corporativism. On Panunzio, see Cavallari (1986).
8 Giovanni Gentile’s pupil Ugo Spirito (1896–1979) was a leader in the inter-war philosophical debate. He joined fascism’s cultural project and tried to
provide corporativism with a theoretical basis. For a reconstruction of his intellectual career, see Dessì (2009).
9 Arnaldo Volpicelli (1892–1968) was a leading light in the inter-war debate addressing relations between State and society. He studied the philosophy
of law under Gentile, and saw corporativism as a way of surmounting the crisis of political and legal modernity; cf. Franchi (2003).
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shared with other theoreticians of State crisis; but they
proposed different ways out of it. The limitations of State
could be surmounted not by focusing on regulation of
social groups, but by extending ad infinitum the weight,
roles and geometry of state power.
Spirito’s “full-scale corporativism” (corporativismo in-
tegrale) reflected a radical organicistic standpoint by
which even the trade-unions—that bulwark of social
independence—constituted a limit on the normalising
effect that State authority was meant to exert upon so-
cial dynamics (Breschi, 2010). There was no trace of that
rhetorical pluralist ambiguity found in other interpreta-
tions of the corporative phenomenon. In short, the indi-
vidual, along with the intermediate formations, should
identify with and be absorbed into the State.
On this view of corporativism, society could not
be given the power to regulate itself or generate in-
dependent forms of regulation. Society could not de-
vise legal systems parallel or alternative to those of
the State, since society could only be envisaged via the
State (Stolzi, 2007, p. 186). The intermediate area of
the social coexistence—the weak link in the chain of
individual–society–State—could but surrender itself to
the all-inclusive embrace of the State.
To Spirito and Volpicelli the merging of the individ-
ual with the State would reach its acme with the so-
called “proprietary corporation”; the complete disap-
pearance of private law and the idea of private inter-
est before the boundless claims of public law. It was
a necessary step—argued Spirito—since under fascism
“private and public, individual and State had got entan-
gled without really merging and ended up by widening
the gap between them” (Spirito, 1932, p. 136). A gap
which was to be bridged by absorbing the private into
the public.
3.3. Voices of Dissent: The Search for a New Balance
between Private and Public
Not everyone thought that corporativism need spell
the end of private and social independence, or that
putting the collective back centre-stage to resolve the
private/public dichotomy need only favour the State.
Certainly not the jurists who—we mentioned earlier—
sought to interpret the new by tools of traditional le-
gal doctrine. And certainly not Santi Romano or those
like him who had all along been sensitive to the hybrid,
composite quality of contemporary legal thinking.10 Even
many jurists who sided politically with the regime felt
that the solution could not be to turn individuals (and
social formations) into organisms of the State.
There could be no arguing as to the centrality of
the State, of course. But, to one faction of legal the-
ory, law was not to be “tied up within the regulations”
(Stolzi, 2012c), while the private–public tandem could
not be resolved within the monochrome framework of
the State. Authors like Widar Cesarini Sforza,11 Lorenzo
Mossa,12 Enrico Finzi,13 Francesco Carnelutti14 or Lu-
dovico Barassi15 were all for shaking free of the doldrums
of traditional liberalism, but not to the point of absolutis-
ing the State in the dynamics of the law.
Romano should be harkened to, and his warning
that organised interests and their potential for regula-
tory independence should be the linchpin around which
to build a new juridical paradigm, a new ratio between
individual, society and State catering for an extra-State
dimension to the law. Cesarini Sforza’s proposal stoutly
upheld the collective arm of the law which promised a
possible point of encounter between the bid for social
autonomy and the guiding control of public power over
private enterprise. The potential conflict between state
and private interest should be resolved within the col-
lective legal arena which that philosopher of law saw as
“more than private and less than public” (Sforza, 1942,
p. 189). To Cesarini Sforza the corporative system offered
a real tertium in legal terms, being so constituted as to
safeguard the private dimensionwithout being absorbed
lock, stock and barrel in state law. As he would write in
1942, “besides private and public interest, there is col-
lective interest, an idea bound up with recognising the
existence of ‘social bodies’, or organized groups creating
legal set-ups and not just manifestations of contractual
autonomy (Sforza, 1942, p. IV).
In other words, the distinction between public and
private should be retained, though clearly the modern
Statewas evolving towards primacy for the claims of pub-
lic power. In this respect there was agreement among
the various legitimating models forming the theoreti-
cal basis of the corporative system. In general it may
be said that “the dialectics of autonomy and heteron-
omy…should comprise not only the law of inner life
within the various social groups, but, still more, the
new criterion for relationship between the private-social
universe and the public-authoritative universe” (Stolzi,
2012c, p. 502). State intervention in the economy was
a reality from the wartime years on: it was a road down
10 Romano’s standpoint on the union and corporation model as proposed by Rocco was not all that critical. Romano’s pluralism blended with a State-
centred vision of law. Thus, intermediate communities (corporations, trade unions, organizations) were a functional part of the State and were to be
brought under its guidance, but should not be crushed or identified with the State; cf. Costa (1986, pp. 134ff.).
11 Widar Cesarini Sforza (1886–1965) was an influential philosopher of law from the idealist school. Corporativism was one of his main areas of research;
cf. Costa (1976–1977).
12 The professor of commercial law, Lorenzo Mossa (1986–1957), ranged in his thinking outside the bounds of traditional liberal formalism. Despite his
broadly antifascist stance, he recognised the regime’s merit in revising labour law; cf. Stolzi (2012b).
13 Enrico Finzi (1884–1973) was one of the finest minds in private law and focused on the developments in the law of ownership; cf. Stolzi (2012a); Grossi
(2013).
14 Francesco Carnelutti (1879–1965) was an influential expert in civil trial law. He helped draw up the 1940 code of civil procedure; cf. Grossi (2000).
15 Ludovico Barassi (1873–1961) was one of the fathers of labour law in Italy. Under fascism he added commentary on corporative to that on civil law;
cf. Passaniti (2012).
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which one might venture further, but which should not
entail the extreme sacrifice of social independence.
Part of Italian legal thinking thus worked to under-
mine corporativism from inside, or rather that part of
the corporative venture which seemed bent on over-
radical compression of individual independence. Theo-
retical skirmishing over the private side to collective bar-
gaining (Barassi, 1939), the exact nature of union repre-
sentation (Pugliatti, 2008), or the limits to the public di-
mension of property (Finzi, 2013) served one purpose
in reality: to safeguard as far as possible the mainstays
of private independence, especially contract and prop-
erty. The new framework of social coexistence afforded
by corporativism was not rejected, but limits should be
set to the private being swallowed up by the State, or the
individual and intermediate organisations being trans-
formed into intrinsic units of State. The crisis of the indi-
vidualist model was plain to behold, and so was the pro-
cess of gradual “publicizing” of legal dynamics; but some
jurists staunchly defended the central role of the individ-
ual which, despite his collective implications, he might
and should preserve.
To authors like Finzi, Cesarini Sforza, Mossa or Ca-
pograssi corporativismwas amechanism bywhich to sur-
mount the limitations of liberal statism, whilst ensuring a
disciplined independence for the unstoppable formation
of interest groups and social organisations lying halfway
between the private and the public. The corporativist
venture need not be pursued to its totalitarian extreme;
suffice it to make room for a legal form which stemmed
from social coexistence, however much it might be chan-
nelled within a state framework.
Focusing on the collective aspect of law, as Cesarini
Sforza pointed out, would enable “the idea of law to
remain free of the State”, and the existence of infra-
state legal channels to have a recognised existence16. To
some, like Finzi, this meant giving real content to revo-
lutionary principles from 1789, setting organised inter-
ests and the social plane centre-stage and providing a
midway version of law—not just state-dominated or only
private—at a time when the State was necessarily inter-
vening in the role of protagonist.17 In this respect organ-
ising the State into unions and corporations would en-
able a “point of equilibrium” to be struck between so-
cial activity and individual power over things, which re-
dounds to thewell-being andpower of theNation” (Finzi,
2013, p. 68).
Therewere others, likeMossa, who sawenterprise as
the lever bywhich to keep private and public in communi-
cation, and to give independence and a central position
to the collective, without it being absorbed wholesale by
the State.18 The institutions overhauled by the new sys-
tem (from collective contract to corporative regulations)
should thus be the concrete tools around which to cre-
ate new forms of regulation, and hence an intermediate
juridical arena midway between autonomy and heteron-
omy (Stolzi, 2007, pp. 392–424).
4. Conclusions
As the latest historical thinking has shown, corpora-
tivism was not just a bluff (Santomassimo, 2006, p. 16).
Manoilesco’s forecast did not come true (the Romanian
scholar had suggested that the twentieth century would
be the century of corporativism) (Manoilesco, 1937). The
experiment was not just chicanery, even in the authori-
tarian fascist version. There is, of course, an enormous
gap between the words and theory that dressed it, and
the concrete product of the corporative revolutionwhich
spawned, not a corporative State, but a bureaucratic
State (Mazzoni, 1943, p. 117; Sforza, 1942, pp. 279–287).
That gap reveals a paradox: that a doctrine stemming
from the attempt to give the new social relations cen-
tral importance and independence (including normative
independence) should have slid so quickly into diehard
statism bent on eliminating all forms of competition with
the State. In that sense some in particular maintain that
corporativism was an enormous rhetorical hoax. Indeed,
the storytelling it spawned is riddled with contradiction
and ambiguity: first and foremost, how the ostensible
attempt to rewrite the extra-state coordinates of the le-
gal system and give regulatory independence to groups
of manufacturers actually led to the establishment of a
state-based legal system.
Insofar as the intention (going by the confused and
contradictory claims of the would-be reformers) was to
give rise to a new kind of state system enabling the early-
century crisis to be surmounted, corporativism was in-
deed an ill-fated experiment: the demand for regulatory
independence by organised groups was absorbed into a
heavily State-run system. It does remain a highly inter-
esting area for analysis, however: first, for the wealth of
theory that it engendered, and second, for the clash be-
tween its starting premises (upholding union autonomy,
transcending the public/private dichotomy, recognising
the authority of new social formations) and the effects it
led to (authoritarianism, bolstering of the State, absorb-
ing of social dynamics into public structures).
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